Anomalous Path Detection
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== Abstract == | == Abstract == | ||
| - | Program execution can be tampered by malicious attackers through exploiting software vulnerabilities. Changing the program behavior by compromising control data and decision data has become the most serious threat to computer systems security. Although several hardware approaches have been presented to validate program execution, they mostly suffer great hardware area or poor ambiguity handling. | + | Program execution can be tampered by malicious attackers through exploiting software vulnerabilities. Changing the program behavior by compromising control data and decision data has become the most serious threat to computer systems security. Although several hardware approaches have been presented to validate program execution, they mostly suffer great hardware area or poor ambiguity handling. |
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| + | We propose a new hardware-based approach by leveraging the existing speculative architectures for run-time program validation. The on-chip branch target buffer (BTB) is utilized as a cache of the legitimate control flow transfers stored in a secure memory region. In addition, the BTB is extended to store the correct program path information. At each indirect branch site, the BTB is used to validate the decision history of conditional branches before it, and more information about the future decision path is fetched to monitor the execution path at run-time. | ||
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| + | Implementation of this approach is transparent to the upper operating system and programs. Thus, it is applicable to legacy code. Due to good code locality of the executable programs and effectiveness of branch prediction, the frequency of run-time control flow validations against the secure off-chip memory is low. Our experimental results show a negligible performance penalty and small storage overhead with ambiguity reduced. | ||
Revision as of 14:25, 27 June 2011
Abstract
Program execution can be tampered by malicious attackers through exploiting software vulnerabilities. Changing the program behavior by compromising control data and decision data has become the most serious threat to computer systems security. Although several hardware approaches have been presented to validate program execution, they mostly suffer great hardware area or poor ambiguity handling.
We propose a new hardware-based approach by leveraging the existing speculative architectures for run-time program validation. The on-chip branch target buffer (BTB) is utilized as a cache of the legitimate control flow transfers stored in a secure memory region. In addition, the BTB is extended to store the correct program path information. At each indirect branch site, the BTB is used to validate the decision history of conditional branches before it, and more information about the future decision path is fetched to monitor the execution path at run-time.
Implementation of this approach is transparent to the upper operating system and programs. Thus, it is applicable to legacy code. Due to good code locality of the executable programs and effectiveness of branch prediction, the frequency of run-time control flow validations against the secure off-chip memory is low. Our experimental results show a negligible performance penalty and small storage overhead with ambiguity reduced.
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