http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php?feed=atom&target=LaoJian&title=Special%3AContributions 2026-05-15T14:10:02Z From NUEESS MediaWiki 1.15.5-7 http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:54:53Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is R15 XOR R16 as shown in the figure on the right.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:50:13Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is R15 XOR R16 as shown in the figure on the right.<br /> &lt;math&gt;R15 \lor r16&lt;/math&gt;<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:50:02Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is R15 XOR R16 as shown in the figure on the right.<br /> &lt;math&gt;R15 \or r16&lt;/math&gt;<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:49:24Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is R15 XOR R16 as shown in the figure on the right.<br /> &lt;math&gt;R15 \oplus r16&lt;/math&gt;<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:29:07Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is R15 XOR R16 as shown in the figure on the right.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:25:34Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is a 32-bit vector R15 XOR R16.<br /> <br /> &lt;math&gt;\min \qquad J = \frac{{C_{{k_n}}^{}}}{{U_{{k_n}}^{}}} + (I - \sum\limits_{i = 1}^I {s_i^{{k_n}}} ){P_T} <br /> &lt;/math&gt;<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:21:24Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is &lt;math&gt;R15 \oplus R16&lt;/math&gt;,<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:20:04Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is disjunction &lt;math&gt;p \oplus q&lt;/math&gt;,<br /> <br /> &lt;math&gt;\begin{matrix}<br /> p \oplus q &amp; = &amp; (p \land \lnot q) \lor (\lnot p \land q)<br /> \end{matrix}&lt;/math&gt;<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:19:25Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is disjunction &lt;math&gt;p \oplus q&lt;/math&gt;,<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:19:06Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is &lt;math&gt; R15 \oplus R16&lt;/math&gt;.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-02T04:13:46Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output {R15} and 16 round output {R16}, which is &lt;math&gt;R15 \oplus R16&lt;/math&gt;.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-01T21:33:15Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> The classical DPA on DES attacks 1 single bit of the transition from 15th round output and 16 round output.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-01T19:58:52Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard DES] (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-01T19:57:57Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition. We will take DES (Data Encryption Standard) as an example to illustrate the DPA and CPA procedure.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-01T19:55:50Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* General */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-08-01T19:36:15Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Models */</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (differential power analysis) and CPA (correlation power analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> Both DPA and CPA shares a common assumption, which is, a cryptographic system will consume power when its output state changes. This assumption is reasonable, since most modern cryptographic systems are implemented based on semiconductor technology. Output state change means there are electrons charged to, or discharged from the semiconductor transistors, causing current flow and resulting in power consumption. This kind of output state change is also called transition.<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T19:03:40Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (differential power analysis) and CPA (correlation power analysis).<br /> <br /> ==Models==<br /> <br /> ==Evaluations==</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T19:01:21Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis attack is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly. The two most widely developed techniques for power analysis attacks are DPA (differential power analysis) and CPA (correlation power analysis).</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T18:58:12Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information, such the as secret key. There are several attack methods, and the power analysis is of our particular interest. Power analysis attack basically examines plenty of power consumption signals sampled during the cryptographic algorithm computation to retrieve the secret keys accordingly.</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T18:37:38Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information. There are several attack methods, among which the power analysis is of our particular interest.</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T18:36:05Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage data and the targeted sensitive information.</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T18:32:32Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack] on a cryptographic system exploits the correlation between the physical leakage information and the targeted intermediate values, such as round keys.</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T18:12:24Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>==General==<br /> <br /> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack]</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Side-channel_attacks,_countermeasures,_and_evaluations 2012-05-30T18:11:39Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;Created page with &quot;[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack]&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack Side channel attack]</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Jian_Lao 2012-05-29T15:18:24Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>Jian Lao<br /> <br /> PhD Candidate<br /> <br /> Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering<br /> <br /> Northeastern University<br /> <br /> 360 Huntington Avenue<br /> <br /> Boston, MA 02115<br /> <br /> Email: jlao AT ece.neu.edu <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> == Education ==<br /> *Ph.D. Candidate: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering], [http://www.northeastern.edu/ Northeastern University], USA, current<br /> :Advisor: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece/index.php/component/content/170?task=view Prof. Yunsi Fei]<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://www.soe.ucsc.edu School of Engineering], [http://www.ucsc.edu University of California, Santa Cruz], USA, 2011<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2009<br /> <br /> *B.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2006<br /> <br /> <br /> == Research ==<br /> <br /> *Side channel attack<br /> *Computer architecture and security</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Jian_Lao 2012-05-29T14:59:11Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;</p> <hr /> <div>Jian Lao<br /> <br /> PhD Candidate<br /> <br /> Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering<br /> <br /> Northeastern University<br /> <br /> 360 Huntington Avenue<br /> <br /> Boston, MA 02115<br /> <br /> Email: jlao AT ece.neu.edu <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> == Education ==<br /> *Ph.D. Candidate: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering], [http://www.northeastern.edu/ Northeastern University], USA, current<br /> :Advisor: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece/index.php/component/content/170?task=view Prof. Yunsi Fei]<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://www.soe.ucsc.edu School of Engineering], [http://www.ucsc.edu University of California, Santa Cruz], USA, 2011<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2009<br /> <br /> *B.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2006</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Jian_Lao 2012-05-29T14:58:34Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Education */</p> <hr /> <div>Yu Han<br /> <br /> PhD Candidate<br /> <br /> Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering<br /> <br /> Northeastern University<br /> <br /> 360 Huntington Avenue<br /> <br /> Boston, MA 02115<br /> <br /> Email: yhan AT ece.neu.edu <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> Jian Lao<br /> <br /> PhD Candidate<br /> <br /> Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering<br /> <br /> Northeastern University<br /> <br /> 360 Huntington Avenue<br /> <br /> Boston, MA 02115<br /> <br /> Email: jlao AT ece.neu.edu <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> == Education ==<br /> *Ph.D. Candidate: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering], [http://www.northeastern.edu/ Northeastern University], USA, current<br /> :Advisor: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece/index.php/component/content/170?task=view Prof. Yunsi Fei]<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://www.soe.ucsc.edu School of Engineering], [http://www.ucsc.edu University of California, Santa Cruz], USA, 2011<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2009<br /> <br /> *B.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2006</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Jian_Lao 2012-05-29T14:57:48Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;/* Education */</p> <hr /> <div>Yu Han<br /> <br /> PhD Candidate<br /> <br /> Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering<br /> <br /> Northeastern University<br /> <br /> 360 Huntington Avenue<br /> <br /> Boston, MA 02115<br /> <br /> Email: yhan AT ece.neu.edu <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> == Education ==<br /> *Ph.D. Candidate: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering], [http://www.northeastern.edu/ Northeastern University], USA, current<br /> :Advisor: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece/index.php/component/content/170?task=view Prof. Yunsi Fei]<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://www.soe.ucsc.edu School of Engineering], [http://www.ucsc.edu University of California, Santa Cruz], USA, 2011<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2009<br /> <br /> *B.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2006</div>

LaoJian http://nueess.coe.neu.edu/nueess/index.php/Jian_Lao 2012-05-29T14:56:43Z

<p>LaoJian:&#32;Created page with &quot;== Education == *Ph.D. Candidate: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering], [http://www.northeastern.edu/ Northeastern University], USA, cur…&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>== Education ==<br /> *Ph.D. Candidate: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering], [http://www.northeastern.edu/ Northeastern University], USA, current<br /> :Advisor: [http://www.ece.neu.edu/ece/index.php/component/content/170?task=view Prof. Yunsi Fei]<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://www.soe.ucsc.edu School of Engineering], [http://www.ucsc.edu University of California, Santa Cruz], USA, 2011<br /> <br /> *M.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2009<br /> <br /> *B.S.: [http://eecs.pku.edu.cn School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science], [http://english.pku.edu.cn Peking University], China, 2006</div>

LaoJian